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Objectives. Anxiety leads to biases in processing personally relevant information. This
study set out to examine whether anxious parents also experience biases in processing
child-relevant material.
Design andMethods. Ninety parents acted as a control condition, or received a social
anxiety or child-related anxiety induction. They completed a task examining attentional
biases in relation to child-threat words and social-threat words, and a task examining
ability to categorize emotion in children’s faces and voices.
Results. There was a trend indicating group differences in attentional bias towards
social-threat words, and this appears to have been only in the social anxiety condition, but
not the child anxiety or control conditions. For child-threat words, attentional bias was
present in the child anxiety condition, but not the social anxiety or control conditions.
Conclusions. In the emotion recognition task, there was no difference between the
control and child anxiety conditions, but the social anxiety condition were more likely to
erroneously label children’s faces and voices as sad.
Practitioner Points
 Parents’ anxious biases may spill over into their child’s world.
 Anxious parents may have attentional biases towards threats in their children’s
environment.
 Anxious parents may over-attribute negative emotion to children.
*Correspondence should be addressed to Sam Cartwright-Hatton, Department of Psychology, Pevensey Building, University of
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We know that anxiety runs in families (Micco et al., 2009), and recent evidence suggests
that a sizeable part of this relationship is due to genetic factors (Eley et al., 2003). Instead,
attention has turned to the environmental factors that put children of anxious parents at
increased risk of developing anxiety.
Anxiety affects behaviour in many ways. Cognitive psychology has chronicled a
number of robust effects that anxiety has on the processing of personal, threatening
material (see Harvey, Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 2004 for a review). These biases are, in
turn, associated with behaviours (particularly avoidance) that maintain anxiety.
If anxiety has such a reliable effect on processing personal threat, and on subsequent
behaviours, we wondered whether it might have an effect on processing of child-related
threat, in individuals who were parents. Two exploratory studies suggest that this
hypothesis iswell founded.Lester, Field,Oliver andCartwright-Hatton (2009) showedthat
parental anxiety was associated with negative interpretation biases about potentially
threatening situations in both their own and their child’s lives. Similarly, Gallagher and
Cartwright-Hatton (2009) manipulated anxiety in parents, telling them that they would
havetogiveanevaluatedpublicspeech.Wheninthisanxiousstate,parentsgeneratedmore
negativeoutcomes forneutral child-relatedevents, andpredicted that thesewouldbemore
distressing to themselves and their child. In the anxious state, they also interpreted child-
related ambiguous scenarios asmore threatening. These studies suggest that anxiety could
influence processing of child-related threat. However, it is not clear what type of anxiety
will trigger this effect. Gallagher and Cartwright-Hatton (2009) suggested that personal,
non-child-related anxiety (in that case, social anxiety) could affect the processing of child-
related threat evenwhen this threatwasof adifferentnature (someof the scenarioswereof
a non-social nature). The ‘Current Concerns’ hypothesis (Klinger, 1996) suggests that this
ought not to be the case, and that biases should mostly occur in relation to stimuli that
closelymatchcurrent concerns. Forexample, a sociallyanxiouspersonmightdemonstrate
biases to social material, but not physical threat material. Someonewith OCDmight show
biases to stimuli suggesting contamination, but not social-threat material. However,
Gallagher and Cartwright-Hatton (2009) showed that inducing social concerns in parents
was sufficient to trigger controlled processing biases in response to a variety of scenarios
coveringarangeofcontent.Wewanted toreplicate thisgeneraleffectandexplorewhether
parental anxiety focused on the child might trigger specific threat-related biases in both
automatic and controlled processing situations.
Therefore, we examined the impact of two types of parental anxiety, namely social
anxiety, and child-related anxiety. There is already evidence that social anxiety can trigger
biases in processing child-related threat (Gallagher & Cartwright-Hatton, 2009). Social
anxiety is a commonexperience and, therefore, itwouldbeuseful tounderstand its impact
onprocessing child-related threat. Also, it is amenable tomanipulation (e.g.Mansell, Clark,
Ehlers & Chen, 1999; Winton, Clark & Edelmann, 1995). The second type of anxiety was
anxiety about one’s own child. This was also to be manipulated in the laboratory.
In this study, we examined twowell-established anxiety-based processing biases, each
of which, we reasoned, might operate in anxious parents. First, we examined attentional
bias to child-related threat. One well-established method for examining this is the dot-
probe task (MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986). In its simplest form, two stimuli (one
threatening, one neutral) appear briefly on a screen. They then disappear and one is
replaced by a dot, to which the participant responds by pressing a key. Speed at
responding to the dot when it appears in the location of the threatening stimulus, and in
the location of the neutral stimulus, indicate where the participant’s attention was
directed when the dot appeared. So, if a participant responds rapidly when the dot


















































appears behind threat stimuli, but slowly when behind neutral stimuli, this suggests that
his/her attention was directed towards the threatening material. Dot-probes are widely
used and have been harnessed to demonstrate attentional vigilance (or sometimes
avoidance) by anxious people, using a range of threatening stimuli (e.g. Harvey et al.,
2004, p; for a review). Of particular relevance to this work, dot-probe studies that have
employed social-threat words have shown that socially anxious participants show a
significant attentional bias to thosewords (Asmundson&Stein, 1994;Musa, Lepine, Clark,
Mansell & Ehlers, 2003).
We hypothesized that parents in the social anxiety condition would display an
attentional bias in relation to social-threat words, and that parents in the child anxiety
condition would show a bias only to child-threat words. We also wished to explore
whether there would be a bias for social-threat words in the child anxiety condition, or a
bias in the social anxiety condition for child-threat words. We expected no biases in the
control condition to either social- or child-threat words.
Second, we were interested in parents’ ability to categorize children’s emotions. The
ability to correctly identify emotion in others is an important skill for anyone, but it is
particularly important for parents to be able to identify their children’s emotions. If a
parent is to respond sensitively to their child, giving just the right level of support, they
must determinewhich emotion is being experienced, and atwhat level. A parentwho fails
to identify distress may fail to respond adequately, and if this failure is consistent, a
predisposed child may come to suffer anxiety. Similarly, parents who over-identify
negative emotion in their children are likely to engage in overprotective behaviours,
which have been linked with the development of anxiety (e.g. McKay, Storch, McLeod,
Wood & Avny, 2011 for a review).
Recognition of emotion in others is a complex task, and is subject to a range of biases,
which can be triggered by a host of psychological phenomena. Most notably, it appears
that anxiety has a deleterious impact on the ability to identify emotion in faces. In
particular, the socially anxious are more likely to assign negative emotions to faces than
less socially anxious people (Coles, Heimberg&Schofield, 2008;Garner, Baldwin, Bradley
& Mogg, 2009; Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Richards et al., 2002; Winton et al., 1995).
A similar effect is apparent for trait anxiety,with anxious individualsmore likely to identify
fear in faces than other participants (Surcinelli, Codispoti, Montebarocci, Rossi & Baldaro,
2006). Since biases in emotion recognition have been associatedwith both social and trait
anxiety, we hypothesized that parents who were experiencing anxiety (‘social anxiety’
and ‘child anxiety’) would be more likely to erroneously assign faces and voices to
negative emotion categories.
Method
Ethical approval for this research was awarded by the University of xxx, School of
Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee.
Participants
Ninety English-speaking parents (of a child aged 6–10, 80 female, all from separate
families) were recruited using advertisements around a University, e-mails to staff and
students and leaflets to schools. The sample was aged 24–46 years (M = 39.3). 87.7%
described themselves as white British, 2.2% as Black Caribbean, 2.2% as Black African,


















































2.2% as Pakistani, 1.1% as Chinese, 1.1% as Asian and 3.3% as Other Children were not
present. Participants were reimbursed £10 (Approx US$15) against expenses.
Measures
Participants completed a demographic questionnaire and the Spielberger Trait Anxiety
Inventory (Spielberger, 1983). The Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) has been
used extensively in research with non-clinical populations, and has excellent psycho-
metric properties.
The diagnostic analysis of non-verbal accuracy-2 (Nowicki & Duke, 1994)
The DANVA 2was employed as a measure of emotion recognition. This computerized task
has adult and child stimuli sections, but only the child sectionwas used here. This has two
subscales: the faces subscale was completed first, followed directly by the paralanguage
(voice) subscale. Both the faces and voices sections are widely used and reported to be
highly reliable.
Child faces. This consists of 24photographs of child facial expressions; 12 female and12
male, showing an equal number of happy, sad, angry, and fearful faces. Each is shown on
screen for 2 s, after which the participant assigns the face into one of four forced-choice
categories by clicking a box corresponding to happy, sad, angry, or fearful.
Child paralanguage. This is composed of 24 spoken segments; 12 spoken by a female
and 12 by a male child actor. Each consists of a child speaking the sentence ‘I’m going out
of the room now, but I’ll be back later’, with a happy, sad, angry, or fearful expression.
Participants are asked to assign each segment into one of four forced-choice categories:
happy, sad, angry, and fearful.
Dot-probe
The dot-probe was employed as a measure of selective attention in response to
threatening words. The task comprised six practice trials, followed by 120 test trials. At
the start of each trial, a cross appeared centrally on the screen for 500 ms. This
disappeared, and an uppercase word-pair then appeared for 500 ms, one to the left of
the screen, and one to the right. Twenty-five milliseconds after these words disappeared,
a dot-probe replaced one word and remained until the participant depressed the
spacebar. The task employed 120 word pairs. For 15 of these, the pair consisted of a
neutral word and a social-threat word. For a further 15 pairs, a neutral word was paired
with a child-threat word. The threat words were paired with neutral words that were
chosen to be of similar length and frequency in the English language. The remaining
pairs consisted of neutral words, which were used as filler items. The dot-probe
appeared after all pairs that contained a child- or social-threat word, and after a randomly
selected 30 neutral pairs. The position of the probe was random, approximately half the
time behind the threat-word and half the time behind the neutral-word. The position of
the threat-word was also randomized, with approximately equal numbers in each
position (left and right).



















































The study was explained to parents, and once informed consent was obtained, they
completed the demographic measure and the STAI. They then rated their current level of
anxiety on a 1–10 Subjective Units of Distress (SUD) Scale.
The study employed three conditions: control, child anxiety, and social anxiety.
Participants were randomly assigned to one condition, and received the appropriate
manipulation:
Child anxiety condition
Participants looked at four photographs of children in potentially threatening situations: a
child lying injured at the bottom of stairs; a child alone, eating pills from a bottle; a child
lying in the roadhaving beenknocked off his bicycle; a close-upphotographof a childwith
a badly bruised and cut face. They were asked to select the picture that worried them
most, then to then imagine their child in that situation and to describewhat theywould be
thinking and feeling.
Social anxiety condition
Participants were told (untruthfully) that they would be asked to give a video-recorded
3 min presentation at the end of the study, and psychologists would later scrutinize this.
They were then asked what they thought and felt about this.
Control condition
Participants were asked to study five pixilated photographs of buildings and rate each for
how aesthetically pleasing they found it. Theywere then asked to choose one photograph
and to say what it made them think and feel.
Participants then rated their current level of anxiety on a SUD Scale.
All participants then completed either the dot-probe or the DANVA (counterbalanced
within condition) and then received a top-up of the anxiety manipulation as follows:
Child anxiety condition
Participants looked again at the picture they chose previously and thought about how this
made them feel.
Social anxiety condition
The experimenter spent a few minutes setting up the video-camera and asking the
participant for their ‘best angle’.
Control condition
Participants saw a further two photographs of buildings and rated them as before.
Participants then rated their current level of anxiety on a SUD Scale.
Participants then completed the second task (either the dot-probe or the DANVA,
depending on what they had completed earlier).
Participants were then debriefed, thanked, and reimbursed expenses.



















































A Chi-square test examined whether there were any significant differences between the
three conditions on key demographic variables: relationship to child (mother/father);
finances; and qualifications. The was no significant difference between the conditions in
relationship to child and finances (relationship:X2(1,N = 90) = 3.67, p < .160; finances:
X2(2,N = 90) = 4.52,p < .340). However, therewas a significant difference between the
conditions in qualifications, X2(4, N = 90) = 16.72, p < .033, with participants in the
social anxiety condition reporting higher educational qualifications than those in the
other conditions.
To examine baseline trait anxiety levels in the three conditions, a one-way ANOVA
with STAI as dependent variablewas computed. This showed that therewas no significant
difference between the conditions1 (F(2) = 2.702, p < .073).
Manipulation Check
To check whether the manipulations were effective, SUD ratings at three points (pre-
manipulation; post-first manipulation; post-top-up manipulation) were compared across
condition. A one-way ANOVA showed no difference among the conditions at Time 1 (pre-
manipulation) F(2,87) = .259, p = .772. A second one-way ANOVA indicated a difference
among the conditions at Time 2 (post-first manipulation) F(2,87) = 34.1, p < .001. Post-
hoc Bonferroni analyses indicated a significant difference between the control and social
anxiety conditions (p < .001) and the control and child anxiety conditions (p < .001), but
no significant difference between the child and social anxiety conditions (p = 1.0). A third
one-way ANOVA indicated a difference among the conditions at Time 2 (post-top-up
manipulation) F(2,87) = 30.2, p < .001. Post-hoc Bonferroni analyses indicated a signifi-
cant difference between the control and social anxiety conditions (p < .001) and the
control and child anxiety conditions (p < .001), but no significant difference between the
child and social anxiety conditions (p = .651). That is, all conditions reported similar
anxiety pre-manipulation, but after the first manipulation, the social anxiety and child
anxiety groups were substantially more anxious than the control condition. This pattern
persisted after the top-up manipulation. These data are displayed in Figure 1.
Experiment One Results2
The analysis for the dot-probe task was based on reaction time responses to probes when
they appeared in the same location as threat words (congruent trials), in comparison to
when they appeared in a different location to threat words (incongruent trials). Only
reaction times after threat-neutral pairs were examined. For each participant, outliers
were removed by excluding detection latencies that fell outside two standard deviations
of their mean score.
1However, mean STAI score for the child anxiety group (Mean = 32.4, SD = 6.9) did appear slightly lower than for the control
(Mean = 35.8, SD = 7.6) and social anxiety group (Mean = 35.3, SD = 7.9). Therefore, all appropriate hypothesis-testing
analyses were subsequently re-computed, using STAI as a covariate. In each case, the pattern of results with STAI as covariate was
identical to those without STAI as covariate.
2 ANOVAs were subsequently recomputed covarying for Spielberger trait anxiety score. The pattern of results was identical to
those reported above


















































For each participant, an attentional bias score for child-threat words was calculated by
subtracting mean reaction time for congruent trials from that for incongruent trials; a
positive score indicates a bias towards these words, and a negative score indicates a bias
away from these words. This was repeated for social-threat words to give an attentional
bias score for these words.
These two attentional bias scores were each subjected to one-way ANOVA (with
condition as grouping variable) to examine the effect of anxiety manipulation on
attentional bias to the child-threat words and the social-threat words.
First, an ANOVA,with attentional bias to child-threatwords as dependent variable,was
computed. This showed a significant effect of condition (F(2,87) = 13.18, p < .001). Post-
hoc one-sample t-tests (two tailed) were then computed to determine the locus of any
attentional bias. For those in the control condition, and in the social anxiety condition,
there was no significant attentional bias to child-threat words (control condition
[t(26) = 0.46, p = .619]; social anxiety condition [t(31) = 1.18, p = .248]). In the child
anxiety condition, however, attentional bias scores towards child-threat words differed
significantly from zero, indicating significant attentional bias to these words (t(30) = 5.72,
p < .001). These results are presented in Figure 2a.
A second ANOVA, with attentional bias scores to social-threat words as the dependent
variable, was computed. This showed a main effect of condition that narrowly missed the
conventionally accepted significance level (F(2,87) = 3.03, p = .053). Since the effect was
as hypothesized, and there was a strong trend suggesting attentional bias, three one-
sample t-tests (two-tailed) were computed to determine its potential locus. Attentional
bias scores in the control and child anxiety conditions did not differ significantly from
zero, indicating no attentional bias to social-threat words in these participants (control
condition [t(26) = 0.84, p = .409]; child anxiety condition [t(30) = 0.78, p = .443]).
However, in the social anxiety condition, attentional bias scores for social-threat words
did differ significantly from zero, suggesting attentional bias for these words (t(31) = 2.14,
p = .04). These results are presented in Figure 2b.
Figure 1. 5Subjective Units of Distress at pre-manipulation, post-first manipulation, and post-top-up





















































































As predicted, parents in the child anxiety manipulation condition showed an
attentional bias towards child-threat words. However, they did not demonstrate a bias
towards social-threat words. Similarly, there was a trend for attentional bias towards
social-threat words for those in the social anxiety condition but not for those in the
other conditions.
So, it seems that a parent who is experiencing social anxiety need not experience
increases in attending to threat in their child’sworld, (unless, perhaps, their child is facing
a social threat). It seems, therefore, that in this situation at least, and in line with the
‘current concerns’ hypothesis (Klinger, 1996), the type of parental anxiety must be
closely allied with the threat material for an attentional bias to emerge.
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. 6Attentional bias to child-threat and social-threat words, by condition. (a) Attentional bias to






















































































To determine whether parents in the three conditions differed in their ability to identify
emotions in children’s faces and voices, ten Kruskal–Wallis ANOVAs were computed
(non-parametric tests were employed as several variableswere non-normally distributed).
Dependent variables were as follows: total errors in classifying faces; total errors
classifying voices; number of (a) faces and (b) voices that were incorrectly identified as (i)
fearful; (ii) angry; (iii) sad; and (iv) happy. See Table to control the risk of type 1 error
from multiple comparisons, the critical p adopted was 0.005. Table 1 shows the
conditions differed significantly in how often participants incorrectly identified voices
and faces as ‘sad’ but not in howoften they incorrectly identified them as ‘fearful’, ‘happy’,
or ‘angry’.
To determine the locus of these differences, a series of Mann–Whitney U-tests were
computed. These showed the difference lay between the social and the other conditions
for both sad voices (social vs. child condition, z = 2.72, p = .006 (trend only); social vs.
control condition, z = 2.96, p = .003) and sad faces (social vs. child condition,
z = 3.85, p < .001; social v control condition, z = 3.79, p < .001). The control and
child conditions did not differ significantly on faces or voices.
Experiment Two Discussion
Parents who are in a socially anxious state appear to have biases in identifying sadness in
faces and voices of children. These results are largely in line with the extant literature,
where socially anxious patients, or participants induced to experience social anxiety,
weremore prone to identifying negative emotion in adult faces (Coles et al., 2008; Garner
et al., 2009; Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Richards et al., 2002; Winton et al., 1995).








pN Median Range N Median Range N Median Range
Faces erroneously identified as follows:
Fearful 27 1 6 32 0 5 31 1 5 0.080
Angry 27 2 5 32 1 5 31 2 5 0.169
Happy 27 0 4 32 1 4 31 1 4 0.489
Sad 27 0 1 32 2 4 31 0 2 <0.001
Total Errors 27 4 15 32 4 9 31 4 12 0.436
Voices erroneously identified as follows:
Fearful 27 2 6 32 1 4 31 1 6 0.503
Angry 27 1 4 32 1 3 31 1 4 0.706
Happy 27 1 5 32 1 4 31 0 5 0.665
Sad 27 1 5 32 3 6 31 1 4 0.003
Total Errors 27 5 17 32 7 8 31 4 13 0.233
3 All analyses were subsequently recomputed parametrically, and again parametrically whilst covarying for Spielberger trait
anxiety score. In each case, the pattern of results was identical to those reported above


















































However, it should be noted that we did not ask parents to categorize emotion in their
own children, which limits the conclusions that can be drawn. No deficit was apparent in
parents who were experiencing child-related anxiety. Therefore, it seems that parents
who are experiencing non-social anxiety need not experience biases in categorizing
children’s emotion.
The bias shown in the social anxiety condition appears to have been specific to
identification of sadness. Therewas no increase in erroneous labelling of faces or voices as
fearful or angry in any condition.
General Discussion
There is much evidence that anxiety causes biased processing of personally relevant
material. The results of these two studies extend this understanding, and suggest that
parental anxiety can also lead to biases in the processing of threat in the child’sworld. The
dot-probe showed that when experiencing anxiety about their child, parents’ attention
was drawn to words that suggest threat to children (but not to social-threat words). The
emotion recognition study indicated that when experiencing social anxiety, parents may
have erroneously identified sadness in children’s faces and voices. These results are
partially in line with those of Gallagher and Cartwright-Hatton (2009), where induced
parental anxiety was associated with biases in interpreting ambiguous child-related
scenarios and predicting more negative outcomes for neutral child-related events and
more child distress at these. The present results indicate that as well as an effect on
controlled processing of threat (as in the Gallagher and Cartwright–Hatton (2009) study),
anxiety has an effect on automatic processes.
These results, however, suggest that the impact of parental anxiety is quite specific.
Although induced social anxiety had an impact on the processing of social-threat words
(albeitatstatisticaltrendlevel),theseparticipantsdidnotdemonstrateanattentionalbiasfor
child-threatwords. So, a parentwho is experiencing anxiety about something in their own
life, such as concern about an upcoming job interview, will not necessarily find that this
impactson theirprocessingof threat in their child’sworld. It seems that thegreatest impact
of parental anxiety is experiencedwhen the parent is actually anxious about the child.
Likewise, child-related anxiety was associated with biased processing of child-threat,
but not social-threat words. It is not clear why social anxiety was associated with poor
child emotion recognition, but child-related anxiety was not. It seems likely that emotion
recognition tasks are more sensitive to social anxiety than to other forms of anxiety.
So, these results, and those of Gallagher and Cartwright-Hatton (2009) give a mixed
picture the impact of non child-focused anxiety on the processing of child-related threat.
Gallagher and Cartwright-Hatton (2009) suggested that induced parental social anxiety
impacts on interpreting neutral and ambiguous child-related events and predicting the
child’s distress in these – tasks that relied largely on controlled processing. This study also
suggests that induced parental social anxiety has an impact on automatic processing of
children’s emotion, but did not produce any evidence of a processing bias on child-related
threat words.
Likewise, a mixed picture of the impact of anxiety focused on one’s child emerges.
Experiencing child-related anxiety increased biased processing of child-threat words, but
had no impact on recognition of children’s emotions.
We conclude, therefore, that the impact of parental anxiety on processing in the
child’s realm is complex. It is likely that many factors dictate whether an anxious parent
(whether their concerns are child-related) will experience biases that spill into their


















































child’s world. However, it seems likely that, in some circumstances at least, those biases
will spill over.
A number of limitations in this study should be noted. In particular, for unknown
reasons, participants in the social anxiety condition were better educated than those in
the other conditions. However, it seems unlikely that this will have caused the differences
identified here. Although this group was quick at identifying the probe in the attentional
bias study, the crucial comparisons for the dot-probe were within group (i.e. between
threat and non-threat words), rendering this difference unimportant. In the DANVA,
errors for this group were equal to or higher than those in the other conditions, which is
the opposite of what one would expect if higher general ability in this group were having
an impact.
Second, this study can only draw conclusions about the effects of state anxiety, and
not trait anxiety, on parental biases. Similarly, although the SUD measures indicated that
anxiety increased in the manipulated groups, we cannot conclude that anxiety
specifically about the child (child anxiety condition) or social anxiety (social anxiety
condition) increased, as these were not measured. Therefore, we cannot conclude that
the manipulations worked through priming of social/child anxiety. It is possible that
merely exposing the groups to social- or child-related material caused the reported
effects.
Third, it should be noted that the sample consisted largely of mothers, with just a few
fathers able to participate. It is possible that the results are reflective more of processes in
maternal cognition than of fathers, and, unfortunately, there were insufficient fathers to
examine this possibility empirically.
Finally, participants’ own children were not included in this study. Future research
might include more personally relevant material, such as photographs of their own
children, for more ecologically valid results.
In conclusion, these studies provide evidence that parental anxiety causes child-
related threat-processing biases. Further research examining the causes and conse-
quences of these biases is warranted. Assuming that these results are confirmed, it may be
advisable to attemptmodification of these parental biases in clinical contexts, using either
standard CBT techniques, or newer bias-modification procedures. Any change in parental
biases might be expected to have an impact on parenting behaviour, and potentially on
children’s subsequent anxious behaviour.
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